The aim of our paper is to formulate and empirically verify the simple backward looking econometric model of the monetary policy rule, which would be able to describe the development of monetary policy rate, namely only on the basis of statistically measured and at the given time available information. We focus on the Czech National Bank, the National Bank of Poland and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank in the period of January 1999 to April 2012. In the present paper we discuss some methodological problems associated with the ex-post empirical verifi cation of the central bank's monetary policy rule. We construct an empirical model of the monetary policy rule, justify the choice and the inclusion of explanatory variables, analyse the statistical properties of time series, and verify the alternative forms of econometric models. Our analysis showed that the development of monetary policy rate in the reporting period can be explained by the past and present development of four explanatory variables: yearly infl ation rate, exchange rate, ECB main refi nancing rate and growth rate of M2. The annualized infl ation rate proved to be statistically insignifi cant in the model. We fi nd interesting that the statistical quality of the estimated model was further increased after a six-month lag of the annual infl ation rate added to the model.
Introduction
In a monetary policy system called infl ation targeting the interest rate transmission mechanism is based on a short-term interest rate of central bank. From the aspect of commercial banks, investment funds and other portfolio investors, successful prediction of changes in the short-term interest rate of central bank plays a crucial role for the appropriate setting of the term structure of bond portfolio. From central bank's aspect, the fi nal decision on a change in monetary policy rate is the completion of a complex multistage management process that is institutionalized by voting of the bank board members. Infl ation targeting is a monetary policy system that accentuates maximum transparency. Signifi cant elements of monetary policy transparency are also the openness and intelligibility of central bank's prognostic apparatus to the professional community. A macroeconomic analyst in a commercial bank would apparently consider such a situation as ideal when they have an opportunity for parallelly working with the same model as central bank. Unfortunately, macroeconomic analytical teams of mediumsized commercial banks are relatively little numerous in comparison with research and analytical departments of central banks. The use of large macroeconomic models of the forward looking type exceeds their abilities from the aspect of time capacity. Hence there arises a question whether the movement of monetary policy interest rates of central banks cannot be estimated on the basis of a "simple" econometric backward looking model with a small number of explanatory variables.
In the present paper the reaction function of the three central banks of the Visegrad Group with independent monetary policy is analysed: the Czech National Bank (CNB), the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB). As shown in Table 1 , central banks have implemented the infl ation targeting policy in all studied countries for more than a decade. All three central banks work in conditions of excess liquidity in the banking sector that is withdrawn through open market operations. The specifi c technical forms of open market operations are different at a glance but in all cases these are operations with short-term (one-week or two-week) monetary policy interest rate. All three banks use highly sophisticated (multi-equation) models that are based on the New-Keynesian approach. However, specifi c methodological approaches are different. The CNB uses a model of DSGE type while these are predictions of "non-conditional" nature that already take into account the assumed trajectory of interest rate development. Parameters are calibrated on the basis of expert estimation. The NBP works with a large macroeconometric model where an emphasis is laid on the econometric estimation of model parameters. Predictions are of "conditional" nature and assume a constant interest rate. Since 2011 the MNB has used a New-Keynesian macro model where the variables are defi ned in the gap form. Parameters of the model are calibrated on the basis of theory and empirical econometric analysis.
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 271 The objective of the present paper is to formulate and empirically verify a "simple" econometric backward looking model of the monetary policy rule that would be able to describe the development of central bank's monetary policy interest rate only on the basis of statistically measured information available at a given time. For this purpose the panel cointegration analysis is used.
The paper consists of two basic parts. In Part 2 an overview of hitherto research that has been aimed at the countries of Central Europe is presented. Subsequently, some methodological problems connected with the ex-post empirical verifi cation of central bank's monetary policy rule are discussed. Part 3 is an empirical one. It contains the construction of an econometric model of the monetary policy rule, reasons for the selection and inclusion of explanatory variables in this model, analysis of statistical properties of time series and econometric verifi cation of alternative forms of the model. Finally, the knowledge of our research is summarized.
Overview of Hitherto Research and Some Methodological Considerations
Among the works in which Taylor's backward looking approach to the monetary policy rule (Taylor, 1993) or somewhat later formulated forward looking approach (Mehra, 1999) is applied to the countries of Central Europe, it is possible to cite these contributions. For small open economies, Mohanty and Klau (2004) introduced a change in the real exchange rate among explanatory variables in the Taylor rule. They worked with output gap and quantifi ed the potential product by means of HP fi lter. They also tested a possibility of the existence of a non-linear monetary policy rule. Maria-Dolores (2005) concluded that parameters estimated in a model for the Taylor backward looking rule showed a higher statistical signifi cance than parameters in the selected forward looking model where the future values of infl ation and production gap were estimated from instrumental variables. Frommel and Schobert (2006) also reformulated the original Taylor rule for a forward looking one. They approximated the infl ation forecast with time horizon t+12 by actual future infl ation. Paez-Farrell (2007) summarized the research conducted until then and tested various alternatives of backward looking and forward looking monetary policy rules, linear and non-linear monetary policy rule, while exchange rate, unemployment rate and production gap in the fi rst differences were included.
Horváth (2008) and Vašíček (2011) tested a possibility of the existence of forward looking non-linear monetary policy rule on an example of the Czech Republic and other countries. However, they used a three-month rate of the interbank market (3M PRIBOR), not the repo rate of central bank. The monetary policy rule for CNB repo rate using the methods of artifi cial intelligence (neural network) was studied by Kukal and Van Quang (2011) . But the partial conclusions drawn from their introductory econometric analysis for CNB repo rate (linear model, eight explanatory variables) are pessimistic because parameters are statistically insignifi cant or they have signs in contradiction with formulated hypotheses.
Some Methodological Problems of Hitherto Research

Choice of explained variable
In the majority of research works central bank's monetary policy interest rate is not directly chosen as an explained variable, but it is the interest rate of interbank money market that expressed in the "old" terminology of transmission monetary mechanism. It plays a role of operative criterion. It is possible to demonstrate some pitfalls of this approach. The interbank market rates are infl uenced by central bank's monetary policy interest rate on the one hand, on the other hand they are affected by market expectations. This problem was analysed by Brada and Brůna (2004) , who accentuated the infl uence of expectation concerning the future behaviour of central bank. E.g. growing infl ation expectations in the market logically lead to an increase in interest rates in the interbank market. However, it does not automatically mean that central bank performs restrictive monetary policy. The aim of ex-post empirical verifi cation of the monetary policy rule is not to test the behaviour of market interest rate in the interbank market but, on the contrary, the behaviour of central bank. Hence we are convinced that the monetary policy rule should be formulated directly for the monetary policy interest rate of central bank.
1 1 There are another reasons, too. Namely, the liquidity stress on the interbank market, which was apparent during the recent fi nancial turmoil. Also changes in the riskiness of uncollateralized debt and oligopolistic structure of the interbank markets exert strong infl uence on the interbank rates.  273
Small open economy
The Taylor monetary policy rule (Taylor, 1993) was verifi ed empirically on the basis of U.S. economy facts in 1987-1992, i.e . in the case of a large closed economy. In a small open economy, the difference between infl ation and infl ation target and the production gap will not apparently be the only explanatory variable. This is the reason why in many works cited above the authors included also various forms of exchange rate in the monetary policy rule (nominal or real exchange rate, level data or fi rst differences). We believe, that in the case of open economy and existence uncovered interest rate parity, it is necessary to test, besides exchange rate, the sensitivity of central bank's interest rate policy to foreign interest rates (Chinn, Meredith, 2004; Durčáková, Mandel, Tomšík, 2005) . The relation to ECB repo rate seems logical in the studied countries.
Potential product and production gap
The calculation of potential product as the starting point to determine production gap is one of the crucial empirical problems of the Taylor monetary policy rule. The authors (e.g. Mohanty, Klau, 2004 and Paez-Farrell, 2007 ) estimated the potential product by means of HP fi lter. The use of HP fi lter for the estimation of potential product development is based on an implicit assumption that aggregate demand adapts itself relatively quickly to aggregate supply development represented by the potential product. However, if an opposite relation holds good, i.e. aggregate demand does not adapt itself to aggregate supply and/or aggregate supply adapts itself to aggregate demand, the "fi ltration" of the time series of gross domestic product does not result in the potential product estimate. Let us imagine an extreme case that long-term aggregate supply (i.e. potential product) is constant and short-term aggregate supply shows certain elasticity in relation to changes in the price level. In this case the cyclic movement in aggregate demand will cause changes both in the product and in the price level. If the reached values of the product are smoothed with HP fi lter, the result will not be the potential product estimate but the "smoothed" movement of aggregate demand in the economic cycle.
Inclusion of past, present and future infl ation
Central banks use forward looking models on which the so called conditional or non--conditional infl ation forecasts are based. In ex-post empirical verifi cation of the forward looking monetary policy rule, some authors (e.g. Mehra, 1999; Frommel, Schobert, 2006) solved the problem by including actual (i.e. actually measured) infl ation at the future time t + h (monthly time frequency) in the model. We consider this approach as unsuitable. The problem can be elucidated by the following example. Let us assume that infl ation at time t is on the level of infl ation target. At the same time, forecasted infl ation in a conditional forecast for t + 12 is above the infl ation target. Therefore central bank will increase its interest rate. Due to this measure actual infl ation at time t + 12 will remain on the level of infl ation target and/or will return to this level. The increase in interest rate at time t cannot be explained by means of actually reached infl ation at time t + 12.
This problem could be solved by the application of the so called conditional infl ation forecast. More exactly, a difference between infl ation target and forecasted infl ation in the framework of conditional forecast can be used as explanatory variable in an econometric model. Currently (or since 2002), when CNB works with the so called non-conditional forecast, data on conditional forecast are not available to the public. The problem of conditional and non-conditional infl ation forecast in greater detail (see Dědek, 2004) .
Backward looking monetary policy rule
Is it reasonable to test backward looking monetary rules in conditions when central banks present only forward looking models? It is possible to react by asking the following question. How is it possible that J. B. Taylor could successfully empirically verify the backward looking monetary policy rule when the Fed operated models "looking" into the future? There are three potential explanations of this contradiction. Firstly, if repo rate is to be changed, the management board does not take ultimate decisions on the basis of the results and recommendations of forward looking models but they implement backward looking policy based on their own individual decision models. Secondly, forward looking models are only a means of communication between central bank and the public while the analysts respect the backward looking approach of the superior management board through the ad hoc manipulation of basic parameters. Thirdly, the management board really takes decisions on the basis of the results and recommendations of forward looking models but logically these models work with exogenous and predetermined variables whose values are known at time t. In all cases some inherent statistical information on the future development of central bank's repo rate is considered in the past data.
Formulation and Empirical Verifi cation of the Model
The formulation of an econometric model was subject to the requirement that all explanatory variables should be observable and statistically available. It was our intention not to work with variables that are acquired (estimated) on the basis of theory and hence on the basis of a number of explicit and implicit assumptions. It applies mainly to different types of equilibrium variables (e.g. potential product, natural unemployment rate, natural interest rate, etc.) or expected variables (expected infl ation, expected GDP, expected exchange rate, etc.). This requirement is not only pragmatic, it is to recall traditional approaches of post-Keynesian economics that basically rejects the use of unobserved variables in the analysis of economic processes and accentuates the postulation of critical realism (e.g. Jespersen, 2001) .  275 transmission channels (e.g. Hlédik, 2004) . In the infl ation targeting system central bank will tend to increase repo rate if domestic currency is depreciated in relation to EUR and vice versa.
High international mobility of fi nancial capital is characteristic of the considered countries. Therefore it is to expect that monetary policy will be infl uenced by ECB repo rate development. It is so because a distinct difference of domestic rates in the money market from equivalent foreign interest rates would cause destabilization fl ows of shortterm speculative capital that would consequently increase the exchange rate volatility and threaten the achievement of infl ation target.
Even in conditions of forward looking monetary policy operating on the basis of a comparison of infl ation forecast and infl ation target it can be expected that also "past" infl ation will play its role in the setting of repo rate. The last known value of infl ation and/or its past development is probably a part of the information portfolio for the defi nition of a rational forward looking approach. The importance of past infl ation will continue to increase when the management loses confi dence in the results of their prognostic apparatus based on a number of theoretical variables, speculatively set values of parameters and subsequent dynamic interactive processes.
Pursuant to Act No. 6/1993 on the Czech National Bank the main objective of CNB's monetary policy is to ensure price stability. If this main target is not affected, the CNB has to "support the government's general economic policy leading to sustainable economic growth". The main objective and support of the government's economic policy by the NBP and the MNB are defi ned in a similar way. Hence it cannot be excluded a priori that in certain circumstances and phases of economic development the bank board can take into account the growth rate of GDP when setting the monetary policy interest rate. In our case GDP growth (only quarterly frequency) is approximated by the growth rate in industrial production.
The growth rate of money supply is the last considered explanatory variable (Hu, Phillips, 2004; Senbet, 2010) . It is a variable that was an alternative monetary policy objective in the historically preceding monetary transmission mechanism. In the theoretical and model concept of infl ation targeting money supply is considered as endogenous, i.e. passively adapting itself to real economic processes. Monetary aggregates may play a role as additional monetary indicators containing information on the future (longterm) development of aggregate demand. In this sense they are complementary to (not competing with) the main prognostic model that is conceived as a medium-term one.
In line with standardly considered economic relations we assume that the bank boards of the CNB, the NBP and the MNB will tend to increase monetary policy rates if domestic currency is weakening (i.e. the exchange rate increases quantitatively), if the ECB increases repo rate, domestic infl ation is increasing (and/or increases above the infl ation target), the real growth rate of domestic economy and growth rate of domestic money supply are rising. In all cases these are directly proportional relations.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on the panels of monthly time series for the period from January 1999 to April 2012. The panels are created by time series of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and are symbolically marked as "series_cz, series_hu, series_pl". The time series are in the log transformation. Table 2 . In all-time series, except the panel lip_yearly_cz_hu_pl of industrial production, most of tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of the unit root presence, so the panels are of I(1) type. In the panel lip_ yearly_cz_hu_pl the tests rejected the hypothesis of a unit root, so the hypotheses that this panel is of I(0) type was accepted.
The relationship between the yearly infl ation rates and the annualized monthly infl ation rates is interesting. The annualized infl ation rates are volatile and contain signifi cant seasonal components. After their adjustment by Hoedrick-Prescott fi lter with smoothing parameter 140 (lir_annhp_cz, _hu, _pl) , it is revealed that the shapes of these time series are very similar to their yearly infl ation rate counterparts. It is interesting (and it is clearly seen on the fi gures of these time series) that the yearly infl ation rates lag behind the price level by 6 months. This situation can be interpreted so that the yearly infl ation rate gives analogous information about the dynamics of the price level at time t as the annualized infl ation rate at time t-6, i.e. about six months earlier. In other words, in the case of the analysis of the yearly infl ation rate we waive the information about the development of prices in the last 6 months and we work with six-month old information. In our opinion, this is a serious problem, which was analysed and justifi ed in detail in Basta (2008, 2010) .
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Cointegration tests
As the time series panels are nonstationary of I(1) type, it is appropriate to test the cointegration of these panels. The Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Kao (1999) Pedroni proposed a test for panel cointegration that allows for heterogeneous intercepts and trend coeffi cients across cross-sections. Consider the following regression
for t = 1, 2, ..., T; i = 1, 2, ..., N (in our case, N = 3 countries -cz, hu, pl); where Y it is individual "cross-sectional" time series and X it is a vector of the "cross-sectional" time
series, the panels of N time series are assumed to be integrated of order one, e.g. I(1). Parameter α represents the overall constant in the model, parameters i are individual effects, which may be set to zero if desired, the parameter vector β i contains cross-section specifi c regression parameters, it are the error terms. Under the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the residuals will be I(1). The general approach is to obtain residuals from the above-mentioned equation and then to test whether they are I(1) by running the auxiliary regression,
for each cross-section, where it is supposed that u it and v it are independent and identically distributed. Pedroni described various statistics for testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration, ρ i = 1. There are two alternative hypotheses: the homogeneous alternative, ρ i = ρ < 1, for all i and the heterogeneous alternative, ρ i <1, for all i.
The Kao test follows the same basic approach as the Pedroni tests, but specifi es crosssection specifi c intercepts and cross-section homogeneous regression parameters, i.e.
The residuals obtained from the above-mentioned equation are tested for unit root through the auxiliary regression
The hypothesis of no cointegration is ρ = 1, the alternative hypothesis of cointegration is ρ < 1. He suggested different test statistics. 
Model
In the case of panel cointegration, it in model (1) creates the stationary time series panel. The applied time series are frequently in the log form, the main reason for this transformation is usually the reduction of heteroscedasticity of error term (for example Verbeek, 2004) . The cross-section specifi c regression parameters β i of such model are called elasticities and are interpreted as relative changes in dependent variables per unit relative changes in the respective explanatory variables. They express the long-run relationships of the time series.
The one-equation model follows from the above formulated economic hypothesis, which is verifi ed in this paper. The board of the national bank decides on the level of repo rate on the basis of available information and knowledge of the problem. It implies that repo rate is an endogenous variable in this case and other variables are exogenous. In this situation the one-equation model is suffi cient for describing the relationship between variables.
In time series model (1) the problem of autocorrelation occurs very frequently. When estimating the model parameters by the least-squares method, the autocorrelation leads inter alia to underestimation of the parameter standard error estimates and thus to overestimation of t-tests, which can lead to erroneous conclusions when testing the model parameters. In this situation it is suitable to use the Period SUR (Period Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) (PCSC -"Panel Corrected Standard Error") method which provides the standard error estimates which are robust to the residual autocorrelation for a given cross-section. This method leads also to the robust results to heteroscedasticity across the cross-sections or periods (Beck and Katz, 1995) .
Empirical Analysis and Results
Tables 3, 4, 5 contain the correlation coeffi cients of pairs of time series in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The correlation coeffi cients with repo rates are relatively high in all countries. The exception is the yearly growth rate of the industrial production (ip_yearly) in all three countries and exchange rate in Poland (er_pl) (in industrial production in the Czech Republic and Poland and in the exchange rate in Poland, the correlation coeffi cients are negative). This is the reason why these time series are not included in the cointegration analysis. Very high correlation coeffi cients of the yearly and annualized infl ation rates are logical and expected. It is certainly interesting that the correlation coeffi cients of the yearly infl ation rates with monetary policy interest rates are higher in all countries than the correlation coeffi cients of annualized infl ation rates with monetary policy interest rates. Kao and Johansen Fisher tests from Table 6 and Table 7 indicate that the above-mentioned panels, i. e. lrepo ?, lir_yearly?, lir_annhp?, ler?, lm2_yearly? , and time series lrepo_ecb are cointegrated ("?" indicates "_cz, _hu, _pl"). From Granger cointegration theory it follows that in the case of cointegration the static model is able to catch the long-run behaviour of time series. Table 8 contains the parameters estimate of the static panel model, in which it is assumed that the monetary policy interest rates of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are explained by the yearly infl ation rates, exchange rates of the currencies of the above-mentioned states to EUR, ECB repo rate and by the yearly growth rate of M2. As the panel of the yearly growth rate of the industrial production is of I(0) type [the other time series panels are of I (1) type] and the correlations of these time series with monetary policy interest rates are very low, this panel was not included in the model.
The time series of the yearly infl ation rates are correlated with the yearly growth rate of M2 and with ECB repo rate, the exchange rates are correlated with the growth rate of M2 and with ECB repo rate, which is correlated with the growth rate of M2. This situation could lead to multicollinearity. But the empirical analysis does not seem to show that the possible multicollinearity would overestimate the parameter standard errors. Therefore, all above-mentioned data panels are included in the models.
With respect to the results of the cointegration tests, the estimated parameters of the models can be interpreted as cointegration parameters. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the presence of autocorrelation, which leads to the overestimation of the index of determination R 2 , F-test and t-test. Deformation of t-test was eliminated by using the Period SUR method of the standard error correction. The estimates of parameters for the explanatory variables are in line with the economic theory. Exceptions are the estimates of parameters for exchange rate in Hungary, ECB repo rate as an explanatory variable for repo rate in Hungary and growth rate of M2 in Hungary. The estimates of the fi rst two parameters are statistically non-signifi cant. The parameter estimate for the exchange rate in Poland is signifi cant at 10%.
In the model in Table 9 , instead of the yearly infl ation rate, the annualized monthly infl ation rate smoothed with HP fi lter is included. It is seen that from the aspect of the index of determination, residual standard deviation s and from the aspect of AIC criterion (Akaike Information Criterion) this model is worse than the fi rst one. The parameter estimate for the annualized infl ation rate in the Czech Republic is statistically non-signifi cant (for other countries these estimates are statistically signifi cant), which confi rms the reality PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 3, 2014  285 that when deciding on the monetary policy interest rate in the Czech National Bank this variable is not considered (also the correlation coeffi cients of the annualized infl ation rates with the monetary policy interest rates in all countries are lower than the correlation coeffi cients of the yearly infl ation rates with the monetary policy interest rates, see Tables 1, 2 and 3 ). This conclusion can have also another interpretation. In accordance with what was stated in Part 3.1, there is an approximate relationship lir_yearly t ≈ lir_annhp t-6 and therefore lir_yearly t+6 ≈ lir_annhp t , which means that the annualized smoothed monthly infl ation rate at time t can be considered as a very good forecast of the yearly infl ation rate at time t+6. The statistically non-signifi cant parameter estimate for the annualized infl ation rate can be understood as the acceptance of the hypothesis that when deciding on the monetary policy interest rate, the forecast of the future yearly infl ation rate development with 6-month horizon is not considered. Similarly, like in the fi rst model, the parameter estimates for the exchange rate in Poland and ECB repo rate to explain the Hungary repo rate are statistically non-signifi cant. The parameter estimate for the growth rate of M2 in Hungary is signifi cant at 10%. The model in Table 8 indicates that when setting the repo rates, the actual yearly infl ation rate plays an important role. Unlike this model, the model in Table 10 includes the yearly infl ation rate lagged by 6 months. The signs of the parameter estimates are the same as in the fi rst model. However, one can easily fi nd that this model is better than the fi rst one from the aspect of the index of determination R 2 , residual standard deviation s and AIC criterion. These results show that when setting the repo rate, the last level of the yearly infl ation rate plays a more important role than its present level. The parameter estimate signs and signifi cance are the same as in the fi rst model. 
Conclusion
We ask a question in our analysis whether it is possible to verify successfully empirically the backward looking monetary policy rule when the central bank declares the implementation of monetary policy on the basis of the forward looking monetary policy  287 rule. Our experience has shown that the analysts in the commercial sphere do not have an opportunity to verify central bank's behaviour when repo rates are changed on the basis of complicated multi-equation models used by central banks. Let us imagine the following potential situations. Firstly, if repo rate is changed, the management board does not take the ultimate decision on the basis of results and recommendations of forward looking models and implements backward looking policy based on their own individual decision models. Secondly, forward looking models are only a "means of communication" between the central bank and the public and through the ad hoc manipulation of basic parameters of the model the analysts respect the backward looking approach of the superior management board. Thirdly, the management boards really takes a decision on the basis of results and recommendations of forward looking models, but logically, these models also work with exogenous and predetermined variables whose values are known at the time of decision-making.
The empirical analysis is based on monthly time series for the period of January 1999 to April 2012 and involves these variables: central bank's monetary policy interest rate, spot exchange rate of the national currency for EUR, ECB repo rate, yearly infl ation rate, annualized monthly infl ation rate, yearly growth rate of M2, yearly growth rate of industrial production. Our empirical research demonstrates that the correlation coeffi cients of particular time series with central bank's monetary policy interest rate are relatively high in most cases. The time series of the yearly growth rate of industrial production are an exception. These variables appeared as statistically insignifi cant also in tested econometric models, therefore they have not been included in the resultant published form of models.
Our analysis revealed that the estimates of parameters in the explanatory variables of annual infl ation rate, exchange rate, ECB repo rate and the yearly growth rate of M2 mostly have the signs in line with economic theory and are statistically signifi cant. The results for Hungary were found to be worse (parameters in the variables of exchange rate and ECB repo rate). Instead of the yearly infl ation rate the annualized monthly infl ation rate smoothed with HP fi lter was included in the alternative model that can also be understood as a very good forecast of future development of the yearly infl ation rate with six-month horizon. Taking into account the index of determination, the residual standard deviation and Akaike information criterion, this alternative model is generally worse than the basic model. The estimate of the parameter in annualized infl ation rate was statistically insignifi cant for the Czech Republic, which confi rms that the decision on CNB repo rate does not consider this infl ation rate. It seems surprising that the quality of the estimated model further increased after the six-month lag of the yearly infl ation rate. It is indicated by the values of index of determination, residual standard deviation, Akaike information criterion and standard error of the parameter estimates. Hence the obtained results document that in the studied central banks the past level of the yearly infl ation rate plays a more important role in the setting of monetary policy interest rate than its present level.
